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The reading of the articles in this symposium has been for me an
interesting and instructive exercise. It has, however, left me with the
impression that the events of vital importance in connection with the
NLRB occurred during the first few years, and that what has happened
since, even including the enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act, has been,
relatively, of little significance.
The real accomplishment of the NLRA was its creation of the right
of working men to organize and join unions without being penalized for
doing so. It is now almost forgotten that, before the NLRA there was
no legally protected right of this kind of association. It was accepted con-
stitutional doctrine that for a government to say to an employer that he
could not, with impunity, discharge an employee for joining a union,
was so great an interference with the employer's privileges that it was a
violation of due process of law. And as to the Federal Government, it was
accepted constitutional doctrine that it was beyond its constitutional powers
to regulate labor relations even in our largest manufacturing and mining
enterprises.
Employers were not only privileged to penalize employees for
agitating for or joining unions, but most employers exercised that privilege.
In the steel, automobile, rubber, chemical and most other well financed
industries, unions were practically non-existent. There was much un-
employment, so that the discharge of workmen, even in large numbers,
for attempted unionization, created no hardship for employers. With no
bargaining strength on the side of employees, wages sought their own level
and the purchasing power of the consuming public declined with wages.
Some far-seeing statesmen in a deeply disturbed Congress saw that,
just as the millions of farmers were ruining their market by each competing
with all the others to sell their products in an over-supplied market, so
millions of working men were, by the same kind of competition, depressing
wages and purchasing power and contributing to the ruin of the national
economy. As contrasted with the case of the farmers, where new and
extremely complicated devices had to be invented, there was at hand,
in the case of the working men, the device of the labor union to in-
crease their bargaining power. In spite of the absence of legal protections,
unions had survived, in crafts which had a monopoly of skills. The
pattern was, then, at hand.
The essence of the Wagner Act was in Section 7.' It said:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to
form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
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through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage
in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection.
The draftsmen of the Act thought that if that right could be made a
reality, a critical economic problem would be at least partially solved.
How could the right be made a reality? The traditional method would
have been to make its violation a crime, punishable by fine or imprison-
ment. The draftsmen chose another device, that of an administrative,
quasi-judicial board, with the power to administer the statute and issue
injunction-type orders against employers who violated it. There was a
pattern for this device in the existing Federal Trade Commission Act.
The choice of the enforcement method was a critical one, and the right
choice was.made.
The legislators who drafted and enacted the statute must have had
grave doubts as to whether the Supreme Court would hold the statute to
be constitutional. A voluntary committee of more than fifty lawyers,
many of them of real distinction, advised the public that it was uncon-
stitutional, on both of the grounds referred to above.
A Board was appointed. It inherited the staff which had been doing
what it could with the labor provisions of the National Industrial Recovery
Act, and hence had the feel of the new legislation. This staff, and the
new people who were appointed to the Board and staff, proceeded to
administer the law as written, and in disregard of the wide-spread doubts
as to its constitutionality. But those doubts cast a heavy burden of
litigation upon the Board's legal staff, because many United States district
courts granted injunctions against the mere holding of administrative
hearings by the Board, on the ground that such hearings were a useless
and expensive annoyance to the employers, and could not, in any evept,
result in anything but a final decision that the act was unconstitutional.
The Board succeeded, however, in getting five fairly typical cases
through the stages of board hearing and decision, and the issuance of
orders against the employers to cease and desist from unfair labor practices
and to reinstate with back pay employees discharged for union activities.
These cases were reviewed and decided in their appropriate circuit courts
of appeal, and thus were ripe for Supreme Court review. They were
all accepted for review by the Supreme Court, were argued early in 1937
and decided on April 12 of that year. The Court held that the Act and
its procedure did not violate the due process clause, and that it was within
the power of the Federal Government to regulate the labor relations of
enterprises engaged in or producing goods for interstate commerce.
It was now possible for the Board to proceed with confidence to
enforce the law. It had held in abeyance large numbers of cases which
had been filed with it before the Supreme Court decisions, and after those
decisions a new flood of cases came to it. Its staff and appropriation were
inadequate, but Congress fairly promptly gave it a considerable supple-
mental appropriation. Its cases were investigated and presented by its
[Vol. 16
COMMENT AND APPRAISAL
staff with diligence and care, and were decided by the Board in accordance
with the law and the evidence. Most of the cases which went to hearing
and decision resulted in some finding of unfair labor practice. This was
to be expected, because the staff was under instructions to investigate the
cases thoroughly, and not to waste the time and the funds of the agency
.by bringing to trial cases which did not have merit.
The hearing officers of the Board had a difficult assignment, because
many employers and their lawyers, in spite of the Supreme Court de-
cisions, regarded the proceedings as personal affronts to the privileges
and dignity of the employers, and the hearing officers as meddlesome
carpet-baggers. But upon review of the Board's decisions in the circuit
courts of appeals, the care and precision with which the Board's staff pre-
pared their cases was rewarded, when the Board's decisions were approved
and its orders enforced in a large majority of the cases. The courts
quickly acquired an understanding of this unfamiliar subject of litigation,
and there was little in the courts' treatment of board decisions of which
the Board could complain.
In brief, Section 7 became the law of the land. Most of the im-
portant industries of the country recognized it as such and began to obey it.
Anti-union practices of long standing were reversed; if supervisors could
not reconcile themselves to the new law they were replaced. In hundreds
of instances, workmen who had, after the enactment of the law, been
discharged for union activities were, as a result of board action, reinstated
and paid for the time they had lost. There they were in the plant,
living evidence of the law which gave workmen the right to organize
and join unions. In plants where practically no workmen at all had
been so foolhardy as to join a union before the law became effective,
elections by secret ballot showed that a large majority of them wanted the
union to represent them. Membership in the unions increased many fold,
and their bargaining power increased accordingly.
Although only a few years intervened between the time when the
Act really became effective, and the outbreak of the war, with its de-
mands upon the nation's manpower, the experience of those few years
indicated that the theory of the draftsmen of the Act was correct. Even
when the demand for manpower was slack, wages did not go down, and
thus contribute to a reduction in purchasing power. And experience since
World War II has been the same. Our economy today rests on high
wages and the enormous and widely distributed purchasing power re-
sulting from those wages. It is constantly inflationary and has imposed
great hardship on those who do not work for wages. But it is the fact,
and it is largely the consequence of the power of labor unions, achieved
by them under the protection of Section 7.
From the foregoing it is obvious that, in this writer's opinion, the
able and interesting discussions in the other papers have to do with refine-
ments of a structure which has undergone no essential change since it was
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built. For instance, the questions treated in Miss Humphrey's paper of
whether the Board should find an 8(5) violation without an election,
or of how long an employer is obliged to continue to treat a union, once
certified, as the bargaining agent of the employees, never were of vital
importance. The bargaining power of a union which has a package of
signed cards but does not have, the support of the employees, or of a
union which once had, but has lost, the support of the employees, will not
produce much in the way of a bargain. In a particular case it may result
in a decision that a strike was an unfair labor practice strike, with serious
financial consequences to the employer. But only a union which has,
currently, the loyalty of the employees, can bargain "from a position
of strength."
The same may be said about Topic II of Miss Humphrey's paper,
relating to "good faith bargaining." If the union has power enough be-
hind it, it will get concessions on subjects as to which the employer would
like to keep a free hand. If it does not have enough power it won't get
the' concessions. And so as to the employer's unwillingness to sign an
agreement or to furnish information with regard to such matters as wage
schedules.
The article of Messrs. Wollett and Rowen on employer speech,
interrogation, espionage and surveillance as violations of Section 8 (a)(1)
shows that there have -been interesting developments of Board doctrine
on these subjects. A problem not discussed in the article because not
relevant to the symposium is the intriguing one of whether a "dear and
present danger" that a labor union will lose an election is of sufficient
moment to override the employer's right to freedom of speech. The
authors' explanation of the Board's increasing tolerance for employer
speech as a result of the increased strength of labor unions and their
greater capacity to defend themselves seems to me to be correct. The
express statement in the Taft-Hartley Act that speech could not law-
fully include threats or promises was, in effect, a confirmation of Board
doctrine. But the question whether a particular speech does contain a
threat or a promise, rather than an argument, is often subtle and difficult
to answer.
The "captive audience" problem is one in which the factual situa-
tions are more or less alike, and the deciding tribunal therefore has the
hope of laying down a doctrine which will decide all the cases. But no
really satisfactory doctrine has evolved. The fairly solid property rights
of the employer, on the one hand, and the rather tenuous rights of the
employees to be let alone, on the other; the fact that some employees
would be influenced while others would be repelled, by what the em-
ployer says; these factors make the problem a hard one to solve. The
same may be said of the interrogation of employees. I think the Board
has shown good judgment in its treatment of these questions.
As for surveillance and espionage, the authors' discussion of what
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the Board might decide in certain situations is necessarily abstract.
Espionage of which the employees are unaware, and which is not followed
by more tangible unfair labor practices such as discharges, is hardly likely
to be the subject of Board proceedings.
Mr. Van Arkle's paper says that, with regard to a number of
questions listed by him relating to representation and elections, the
Board was at first liberal in allowing employees freedom of choice as
to such questions as the frequency of elections, and the bargaining unit,
whether it should be craft or industrial, or should be limited to one or
several plants of the employer. But, he says, the Board has, during its
twenty years, restricted this freedom in the interest of protecting settled
collective -bargaining relationships.
I think Mr. Van Arkle has proved his thesis. Taking the so-called
Globe' doctrine for an example, the sort of local option by which the
members of a craft could segregate themselves from an industrial unit if
a majority of the craft so desired it was, at least at the time of its pro-
mulgation, a fair and logical doctrine. Industrial unions were still new,
were really still experimental. There was, officially, mortal enmity be-
tween the AFofL and the CIO. For the Board to have forced the AFofL
craftsmen into a unit where their spokesman at the bargaining table
would have been a CIO agent, would have been quite intolerable. The
CIO had, or was thought to have, egalitarian ideas which might not
have recognized the worth of the special skill of the craftsmen. Thus
it would have been emotionally offensive and might have been economically
unfair to deny freedom of choice to the craftsmen. And I thought, and
still think, that even by the time of the American Can decision,' it was
not fair to deny the craftsmen their option, just because there had been
a year or two of bargaining on an industrial unit basis. I thought that
having in the bargaining unit an important group not really willing
to be represented by the spokesman for the unit would not make for
tranquil relations. But the Board has, as Mr. Van Arkle says, tended,
with fluctuations, to refuse to sanction a change in the unit, once it is
established. It would be interesting to have a follow-up on the decisions
to see whether the industrial unions have succeeded in digesting what they
have, with the sanction of the Government, swallowed, and whether the
employer is happy in having only one interest represented on the other
side of the table.
The early attempt of the Board in the Aluminum Company4 and
the Axton-Fisher Tobacco Company5 cases, to require the unions to com-
pose their inter-union disputes before coming to the Board, was frustrated
by the AFofL--CIO split. Mr. Van Arkle's view that now there is a
considerable amount of dependable extra-legal machinery for the settle-
2 Globe Machine and Stamping Co., 3 N.L.R.B. 294 (1937).
3Amercian Can Co., 13 N.L.R.B. No. 126 (1939).
4 Aluminum Company of America. 1 N.L.R.B. 530 (1936).5 Axton Fisher Tobacco Company. I N.L.R.B. 604 (1936).
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ment of such disputes, and that the board should keep hands off and let
that machinery operate, seems sound.
The tendency of the board to regard contracts for longer periods
as -bars to the election of new representatives seems to the writer to be a
natural development. Workmen have settled into their union relation-
ships more fully than they had in the early years, and are not so likely to
change unions on short notice. But, as has been said above, if the union
has in fact lost the support of those who voted it in, it can't do effective
bargaining even though the Board still requires the employer to bargain
with it.
Professor Forkosch's paper shows that there has developed, under
the Act, an elaborate experiment in Federal-State relationships. The un-
willingness of Congress to put a quantitative limit on the enterprises
to which the original Act should apply; the unwillingness of the Supreme
Court to draw such a line, when Congress had not done so, though it
was suggested to the Court by counsel for the Board that such a line
might be drawn; the budgetary and administrative problems facing the
Board if it assumed all the jurisdiction which the Act granted to it;
these are at the root of the problem. This writer is not aware of any
similar legal situation. It is as if a county sheriff should announce that,
because of a lack of manpower and equipment, the law relating to
certain named lesser offenses would not be enforced. If, without an-
nouncement, he had in practice ignored such lesser offenses, the e.ist-
ence of the law might deter violation, since, in any particular case the law
might be applied. In the case of the NLRB, the announcement and
the practice leave an important no-man's land. A state cannot, even if
it is willing, fill the gap, unless it enacts a replica of the Federal statute
and administers its law substantially as the Federal law is administered.
If one or several states should do that there would still be a complete
lack of uniformity in the application of Federal law in the different parts
of the country.
Professor Forkosch has made this problem the subject of what seems
to me to be a remarkably acute analysis, and has indicated what should
be the answers to the many different questions that can arise. The really
troublesome situation that develops out of the Board's announcement
of quantitative limits on the type of cases it will take have not been liti-
gated, and perhaps cannot be litigated because the statute does not direct,
but only "empowers" the Board to take any case at all. Yet the present
practice seems to this writer to be impossible. It seems to mean that an
employer whose business is small but is otherwise just like that of a
larger employer against whom the Board would proceed, can with im-
punity, discharge his employees for joining a union. His action would be
in direct violation of an applicable Federal law, yet his immunity from
the sanctions of the law has been assured to him by official announcement.
In the early years of the Board, such small cases were taken, though
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there was no lack of large cases to occupy the time of Board and staff.
Now there is much wider recognition of the law, much more voluntary
compliance, .and much greater power in unions to retaliate against viola-
tion. It would seem that small employers who are covered by the Act
would, if they were not granted immunity, usually obey the law, and the
Board would not be greatly burdened by the handling of such cases as
would need to be handled. So far as holding elections is concerned, the
Board's skill and efficient machinery is such that that should not be a great
burden. The present situation is legally anomalous and must result in
unequal and unfair treatment of employees. If the real purpose of the
Board in renouncing a part of its jurisdiction is to relieve small employers
from obedience to the law, the renunciation has no justification at all.
Obedience to this law is not a burden. It involves no reports, no paper
work, no keeping of records. Except for the duty to bargain, one obeys
the law by doing nothing at all. Even if it were a burden, it is the law,
and should not be set aside by those appointed to administer it.
I do not find in these excellent articles, nor does my own observation
of the work of the Board during its first twenty years indicate, any
considerable evidence that this law, in action, has been swayed by the
political or economic outlook of its administrators. The Board's decisions
run well beyond one hundred volumes, and, although they deal with a
subject on which feelings run high, and which is tied to a constantly
changing economic situation, there is, I think as great a consistency of
doctrine in these volumes as any admirer of stare decisis could wish. I
think the Board is an example of the advantages of the administrative,
quasi-judicial tribunal, combining an unusual understanding of the sub-
ject matter with which it deals, with a judicial attitude toward its decision-
making functions.
As with any important law, after its main principles are established
there are many fine points on its margins which still have to be litigated.
These cases are important to the litigants, and important to the law, since
their correct decision is necessary to keep the main structure from being
eroded at its margins. But, in comparison with the work of laying tfie
legislative and constitutional foundations of the law, and getting its
central principle, the right of employees to organize unions, established,
this marginal litigation is like a cold war, or at most a guerrilla war,
as compared to a full-scale shooting war.
I congratulate the Board upon its approaching twentieth birthday.
In my opinion, the Board and its staff have administered the law with
unusual skill and diligence, and, under this administration the law has
achieved its declared purpose to a greater degree than any other important
statute of which I am aware.
